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exceptions to the limitation, applying the rule expressio unius exclusio alterius
to the enumeration. 50 In Alabama, on the other hand, the general limitation
begins: "All taxes levied on property .... "51 and the exemptions are enumerated in an entirely different article.5 2 Furthermore, the exemption provision is
mandatory. No necessary inference flows from the mandatory exemption of
some classes of property to the effect that the legislature may not make other
classes exempt by statute.
In the nonproperty tax area, where not even units with surface plausibility
can be designed, the book is a better book. The discussion of the history of the
income tax under the state constitutions is a genuinely good one. This leads me
to believe that the shortcomings of Constitutional Uniformity and Equality in
State Taxation are principally the product of measurement-mindedness in
legal research. I hasten to add that in spite of these shortcomings, the book
has made a significant contribution.
Jo DESHA LucAs*
50
See, e.g., People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah
Gemeinde Ungeaenderter Augsburgischer Confession, 249 Ill.
132, 135, 94 N.E. 162, 164

(1911).
51

ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 211.

52 Id.art. IV, § 91.
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Professional Negligence. Edited by THOMAS G. ROADY, JR., and WiLLIAM R.
ANDERSON. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1960. Pp. 332. $10.00.
The term "professional" is used in the title of the book in a broad sense and
includes not only doctors, architects, engineers, teachers, and attorneys, but
also pharmacists, abstracters, funeral directors, insurance agents and brokers,
artisans and tradesmen. The book also includes articles on related subjects
such as "Insurance Against Medical Professional Liability" and "Modem
Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a Medical Malpractice Suit." The
styles of the writers usually are clear, their attitudes objective, and their reviews of the cases fair and comprehensive.
Each chapter spells out with precision the duty of certain professional
groups to the public and to their clients or patients. Each chapter contains
material so important to the members of each professional group under consideration, that the applicable article in this book ought to be prescribed as
"must" reading for students preparing for a career in any of the professions
and trades treated, as well as of practitioners in these professional groups. This
material informs the prospective practitioner of his obligation to be well in-
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formed in the field in which he practices and with reference to his duties of
care, skill and diligence in rendering professional service to his client or patient. Schools could do worse than place a copy in the hands of each law or
medical student before he is admitted to practice, and professional societies
would do well to furnish a copy to each member of their association. Undoubtedly, despite cursory courses in school relating to their legal responsibility in the areas discussed, most professional men often have only a very vague
or indifferent notion as to the extent and scope of their legal obligations to
clients, or patients, and as to what conduct on the professional man's part
may give rise to legal liability to pay for the damages a client or patient may
suffer because of advice or actions or inaction of the practitioner. Unfortunately, practitioners usually get their true education in these areas only after
some conduct on their part has given rise to claims or lawsuits for damages
based upon alleged negligence or malpractice.
There is a brief and cogent introduction by Dean John W. Wade of the
Vanderbilt University School of Law in which he attempts to set the social
problems involved in proper perspective. He rightly notes that the "major
special attribute of these cases involves the statement of the standard of care to
which the defendant is held," but in attempting to express in concrete terms
what that duty is, he encounters the same difficulties which have long confronted the courts. He points out that when the courts sometimes state that the
care and competence the practitioner must measure up to is the skill and
knowledge of the average member of the profession, it literally means that
half of the members would fail to meet the standard. He believes that what is
actually meant is that which is "normal" to a member of the profession in
"good standing." In support of this he cites Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which the reviewer has not had an opportunity to see. But this reviewer feels
that the concept that the acceptable norm is that of doctors in "good standing" should be abandoned. The term "good standing" can have no useful
meaning to a jury as a guide in determining whether the practitioner used
reasonable care and diligence. The words might mean one thing to jurors, another to the courts, and still another to other members of the same profession.
Whether the words refer to the fact that the person in question is licensed to
practice his profession, or is admitted to membership in the usual professional
societies, or is favorably regarded by his fellow practitioners is open to doubt.
And whether it means any or all of these things, it nevertheless furnishes no
useful criterion to a jury. A person might qualify in each respect mentioned
and nevertheless, along with a large number of his colleagues similarly qualified, not use that care or skill that a reasonably well qualified and informed
practitioner in the exercise of ordinary care ought to have used in the particular matter. Many practitioners can meet the test of "good standing," whatever
meaning is ascribed to those words, and yet in the matter of competency and
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care function at a level far below that which a reasonably well qualified practitioner, exercising ordinary care, would use. May the practitioner in "good
standing" not at times be extremely careless? If so, the practitioner who happens to be careless on the occasion when harm is done by his carelessness,
could defend on the proposition that there is no legal liability because other
practitioners in good standing are careless at times.
Dean Wade wisely urges restraint on the part of lawyers in bringing malpractice actions or taking steps which may lead to publicity in such cases because of the harm that a judgment in such an action, or even the bringing of an
action can cause to a practitioner's reputation where a physician or a lawyer is
sued. He believes there is a regrettable evil connotation associated with the
term "malpractice," suggesting intentional wrongdoing or utter incompetency.
He recommends that eradication of the term "malpractice" might be helpful.
While the rule as to duty of care, and responsibility for breach of the duty
resulting in harm, are similar in the several professions and trades, the Dean
concludes there are distinctions to be noted. With respect to the harm caused,
it may be economic, or involve physical harm to person or property. The alleged wrongful conduct may involve a physical act negligently done, or giving
erroneous information amounting to negligent misrepresentation. And finally,
Dean Wade remarks upon the timeliness of this useful volume because of
greatly increasing litigation involving questions of professional conduct, care
and skill, particularly in the medical field.
The general subject of the duty owed by a professional person in the conduct of his calling is discussed by Professor William J. Curran, Professor of
Law and Legal Medicine at Boston University. He reminds us that professional service is made up of learning and skill and that the standard of care for
all professions appears to be basically the same, i.e. the general average of
professionally acceptable conduct. He characterizes this as a minimum standard and compares it with the "reasonable man" concept which requires average prudent conduct of a layman, whereas in the case of the professional,
merely average conduct appears acceptable. And this requirement is further
diluted by limiting it to the care used by other practitioners in the "same" or
"similar" localities. Illinois long ago, in a well reasoned opinion, rejected the
"average" concept as unsound.' The court held that the care required was
that of a "good" physician; and while the highest attainable degree of skill
and proficiency is not required, the law does not contemplate "average" merit;
that in determining who meets the legal standard, the court will not "aggregate into a common class quacks, the young men who have had no practice,
the old ones who have dropped out of practice, the good, and the very best,
2
and then strike an average between them."
1

Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Il. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
at 536, 8 N.E. at 836.

2 Id.
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Professor Curran examines the interesting point that jurors, though the
judges of the facts, must often rely on the opinion evidence of other members
of the defendant's own profession for evidence as to what conduct is consistent
with ordinary care. He asks: How well has the profession done in judging itself, and concludes it has not done well; that other practitioners are reluctant
to testify against their fellow practitioners (as anyone who has tried a malpractice case knows only too well) and raises the point that in opinion evidence
in this field, one only gets "opinions" of individuals, acting individually and
in an uncontrolled way, giving opinions which may not be representative. He
provocatively inquires whether any one practitioner knows the answer as to
what is "professionally acceptable conduct." He has worthwhile observations
with respect to problems of proof as well as other miscellaneous matters which
he gathers under the general heading of "Some Questions of Ethics." Under
this last section he considers the role and responsibility of attorneys for each
side in this class of litigation, and of the expert witness.
In considering what "The Future" is likely to bring in the field of malpractice actions, Professor Curran reminds us that the law in the field of professional liability is almost totally common law. He believes that the use of negligence as a basis for liability with the resulting necessity for the establishment
of a standard of care; use of the advocacy method of presenting evidence,
finding facts, and producing witnesses, with the attendant difficulties in this
class of litigation; and use of the jury system are all undesirable in this class of
cases. In his opinion, the jury system has not proved effective in these cases,
and the fault system brands the defendant as incompetent within his profession
and results in a tenacious emotional fight by the defense as well as high verdicts in cases involving personal injury.
Professor Curran prophesies that the problems common to the field of tort
law and civil litigation are most apt to result in an insurance-based compensation system carried by the professions or by their clients and patients, possibly
as part of a government sponsored plan in the personal injury area, and he
suggests that the medical societies are active in the field, have the necessary
organization and political acumen, and may be the moving force which helps
produce the change.
It is regrettable that Professor Curran lends support to those who would
abolish use of the jury system in these cases. As one who has worked in the
courtroom with judges and juries for many years, this reviewer cannot view
lightly what he considers unconstructive criticism of the jury system by one in
Professor Curran's position of responsibility. The criticism makes no reference
to the many favorable aspects of the jury system, or to the toughness and
vitality that have enabled it to survive through several hundred years, performing a useful part in the administration of justice. Nor is consideration
given to the desirability and importance of having twelve impartial laymen
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decide disputed fact issues. It is probably true that no system for the administration of justice yet devised by man is entirely satisfactory at all times in all
classes of cases everywhere, but no system has yet been devised that has
worked better in that respect or that has greater flexibility in adapting itself to
changing social needs and conditions. We should not regard lightly or discard
casually a system of administering justice that has so long proved honest,
impartial, and reasonably successful, without very persuasive evidence that
something better is being offered.
A most comprehensive, and valuable chapter in the book is entitled "The
Care Required of Medical Practitioners," by Professor Allan H. McCoid of
the Law School of the University of Minnesota. It is eighty-four pages longone-fourth of the entire book. It alone is worth the price of the entire book.
Professor McCoid briefly reviews the historical background of malpractice
litigation, discusses the early cases stating the duty of the practitioner, and
classifies the varying judicial expressions as to the practitioner's duty to use
care. He discusses qualifying considerations which modify somewhat the practitioner's duty to use ordinary care, as in the "school of practice" or "specialties" rule, which has proved a great stumbling block to recovery in these
cases, as has the "locality of practice" rule which Professor McCoid also carefully examines. The duty to use appropriate and available testing procedures
is discussed, as is the question of liability for experimentation on the patient.
Some interesting facets of the "Duty to Inform or Disclose Facts" are reviewed; the "Duty to Refer the Patient to a Specialist" is considered; and,
under the heading "Vicarious Liability," the cases passing on the problem of
liability for acts of others, such as nurses, X-ray technicians, and for acts or
omissions of assistants of the practitioner are analyzed. He states the rule of
care as one of "customary practice," considers the problem of "Proof of the
Standard of Care and Breach," mentioning that to meet this burden the plaintiff generally must rely upon the testimony of medical experts. It is interesting
to learn that to aid the plaintiff in meeting this burden, Alabama treats medical
books as substantive evidence, and statutes were recently adopted in Massachusetts and Nevada which provide that "a statement of fact or opinion on a
subject of science or art contained in a published treatise, periodical, book or
pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the court, and if the court finds that it is
relevant and that the writer of such statement is recognized in his profession or
calling as an expert in the subject, be admissible.., as evidence tending to
prove said fact or as opinion evidence." 3
Res Ipsa Loquitur is mentioned as having been held applicable in malpractice actions in some states, in such cases as the failure of the physician to use
X-ray for diagnosis of a fracture or dislocation, and failure to remove foreign
objects such as surgical sponges from a patient's body.
3 PRoFEssioNAL NEGLIGENcE at $4,
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Professor John G. Fleming, of Canberra University, Australia, in a chapter
entitled "Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability," briefly
(thirteen pages) covers in a general way the same areas of the law in the British
Commonwealth that Professor McCoid covered for the United States. His
chapter includes the topics of "Liability of Hospitals" and "Standard of Professional Skill and Care." He concludes that the common law techniques offer
sufficient elbow-room for constant adjustment and change, and that, basically,
American and English law have approached these problems in a similar way
and have found similar solutions.
Problems of assembling the evidence and trying cases involving claims of
malpractice are discussed by Fitz-Gerald Ames, Sr., of the San Francisco Bar,
in the chapter entitled "Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a
Medical Malpractice Suit." He makes a number of very helpful practical suggestions with respect to searching out material from the physician and the
hospital, pleading and trial preparation; and suggests specific questions for
use during voir dire examination of the jury, questions which he has found
particularly necessary in cases against physicians. How far such interrogation
of the jury would be permitted in Illinois in view of present Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 24.1 is not certain. He also discusses trial tactics which from experience he has found useful and effective.
The chapter on "Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability" is most
illuminating. Bernard D. Hirsch, an attorney in the law division of the American Medical Association, has written an analysis of the principal insuring
agreements, exclusions, and conditions in standard policies insuring physicians against "Medical Professional Liability," and then prepared an analysis
of the answers to a questionnaire sent by the AMA to insurance companies.
The questionnaire posed hypothetical factual situations and asked the insurance companies to express an opinion with reference to insurance coverage in
each case. The association is to be commended for this imaginative and valuable undertaking, as are the insurance companies for their candid and helpful
responses. Not infrequently, malpractice actions are brought on the theory
that the physician orally guaranteed a cure or successful result. It is interesting
to note that the insurance companies will defend such an action for their assured in some instances, particularly where that charge is coupled with other
charges of malpractice, but that they take the position the insurance policy
does not insure against this kind of a risk.
The authors of the material in the remaining chapters of the book discuss in
the same general way the law and cases with respect to other professions and
trades, the legal duty to have the knowledge of their trade possessed by other
reasonably qualified persons in the trade, the duty to exercise care and skill in
the use of that knowledge, and liability which may result from failure to
comply with those legal requirements.
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The assembly in one book of the law covering this broad area of professional responsibility provides a legal overview which should be helpful to the
members of the professions and trades covered by these studies, helpful to the
bench and bar, and, it is to be hoped, beneficial to the general public by creating a greater awareness in those professions and trades of the obligations
resting upon them to the communities and the persons they serve.
Louis G. DAVIDSON*
* Member of the Illinois Bar

